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Off-Fann Work Participation, On'-F^rm Labor Supply
and On-Farm Labor Demand of U.S. Farm Operators
by Wallace E. Huffman and Hisham El-Osta
An agricultural householdmodel provides the framework for modeling off-farm work
participation and off-farm and on-farm workdecisions of farm operators. The empirical
results are obtained ftom fitting the econometric model to data from a large national survey.
In the estimated structural off-farm workparticipation equation, the operator's off-farm wage
offerhas a strong positive effectand otherhousehold income has a negative effecton the
probability of off-farm work. For farm operators who participate in off-farm work, thewage
elasticity of their off-farm labor supply is positive but of their on-farm labor demand is zero.
Theincome elasticity of off-farm work for those who participate in off-farm work and of on-
farm work for those who specialize in farm work is negative. Implications aredeveloped for
the farm problem.
Key words: agricultural household model, farm operator, off-farm work, on-farm work, off-
farm wage, timeallocation, farm family labor.
Off-Farm Work Participation, Off-Farm Labor Supply
and On-Farm Labor Demand of U.S. Fann Operators
by
Wallace E. Huffman and Hisham £l-Osta*
10-17-97
Multiple job-holding by members of farm households in the U.S. and in other Western
countries has becomea well established strategy for diversifying households* financial
position. Aheam, Perry, and El-Osta (1993) show that off-farm incomein 1990comprised
85 percent of total household income with most of the off-farm income~82 percent for the
reporting household—generated in the form of wages and salaries. With the exception of 1973
and 1975, when farm commodity prices were relatively highj U.S. farm operators' non-farm
I
income has exceeded their net farm income, a trend that has been evident since 1968
(Huffman, 1991). Before World WarII about 6 percent of all farm operators worked off the
farm 200 or moredays each year (Carlin andGhelfi, 1979), but recent Census data show that
the proportion of operators working 200 or more days has risen to over 30percent (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1994, p.8). The increase in the proportion of dual employment by
The autfiors are Professor ofEconomics and Agricultural Economics, Iowa State University, and
Economist, USDA-ERS. Numerous helpful comments wereobtained fromPeter Orazem. The research
was undertaken imder a USDA-ERS Cooperative Agreement and with support of the Iowa Agriculture and
Home Economics Ej^riment Station. The views expressed in this paper are Ihose ofthe authors only and
do not necessarily reflect tiiose of the U.S. Department ofAgriculture.
2fann operators is part of the long structural change that has occurred in U.S. agriculture
(Huffman and Evenson 1997).
Agricultural household models provide the framework for modeling farm and off-farm
work participation and hours of work decisions of farm household members.' Several U.S.
studies have focused on the off-farm participation and hours decisions of the farm operator or
farm operator and spouse, e.g., Huffman 1980, Gould andSaupe 1989, Huffman andLange
1989, Lass, Findeis, and Hallberg 1989, Lass and Gempesaw 1992, Tokle and Huffman 1991,
and Jensen and Salant 1985. These studies havealmost exclusively used samples where the
population resides in one or two states. Oneexception is a study by TokleandHuffman 1991
who use a national sample from the CurrentPopulation Survey to examineoff-farmwork
participation decisions. Another exception is El-Osta and Aheam 1996, who use an early
USDAFarm Costs and ReturnsSurvey (FCRS) to examine off-farmworkparticipation
decisions and to impute opportunity costto unpaid farm labor forU.S. farm operators. These
studies have not focused on the other majordimension of work for farm household members—
on farm work.* In studies of Israeli farm households, Kimhi 1994 examined both the decision
toparticipate in farm and off-farm work. The Israeli data, however, contain only qualitative
information on the extent of on-farm and off-farm work and not data on hours of work.
The purpose of this paper is to provide econometric evidence for off-farm work
participation, off-farm hours ofwork, and on-farm hours ofwork ofU.S. farm operators.
On-farm hours decisions are e^^ined for both farm operators who participate in off-farm
wage work and those who specialize in on-faiin work. Hence, we attempt to advance
knowledge about farm operators' work decisions by providing a set of results, including new
3behavioral estimates for on-farm hours, that permit a broader set of comparisons than earlier
studies of off-farm work. The observations for this study are farm operators in the 1991
FCRS, and information from this survey is supplemented by state level data on climate and
economic conditions.
The next four sections describe the economic model; the data, variables, and
econometric model; the empirical results; and conclusions and implications.
The Economic Model
The agricultural householdmodel is the basis of our economicmodeling. The model
combines the agricultural producer, consumer, and labor-supply decisions of agricultural
households into a single conceptual framework. The practical implication is that a large
number of decisions are madejointly, including choice of inputs, outputs, and technologies for
farm production, inputs/goods for household consumption, and off-farm work participation
and work hours by household members (see Huffman 1991).
The labor supply decisions of members of farm operatorhouseholds are derived from a
behavioral model that permits both farm and off-farm work (see Huffman 1991). Under the
assumption that the decision unit considered here is a risk-neutral single-family farm household
with one utility function and that operator's and spouse's time are heterogeneous, the optimal
allocation of time by farmoperators and their spouses between leisure, on-farm work and off-
farm work is obtained by solving the following optimization problem:^
Maximize U = UiT^ r/, Y; C, T), (1)
4subject to the constraints:
f = Tj. + +r;. Tl ^ 0, i=o, s, (2)
P/ =E KK ^ * V, (3)
Q = q(t;, t;, X-, c, c, <t)). (4)
where Vin (1) is farm household's utility (or welfare) function; Ydenotes goods purchased in
the market, 7/ and 7/ are operator's (oj and the spouse's (s) hours of leisure; Cis family
human capital; and t represents other factors such as life stage, numberof children. In
equation (2), ^^is the annual hours endowment for the operator and the spouse, Tj is annual
hours allocated to farm work, and 7)^ is annual hours allocated to off-farm work. We
specifically consider the possibility that optimal off-farm work hours for an individual might
be zero in anyyearand is equal to zero for a significant share of our sample households, a
nonnegativity constraint is hence imposed on 7^ ? In equation (3), Py denotes the price of
consumption good 7, represents the hourly wage for non-farm work, the term {P^Q -
depicts the net income of the farm business where P^ is price of farm output Qand isprice
ofpurchased farm inputs X, including hired farm labor, and Vsignifies other household
income. The technology offarm production is described by Q(,) in (4) with (j) depicting
location specific characteristics, e.g., local climate and soils.^
The wage-offer for non-farm work where i=o, s) in (3) depicts the off-farm labor
demand facing the operator (or the spouse) and as such, is assumed to depend on the
individual's marketable human capital (C*) and jobor locational characteristics-local labor
market conditions (Q), local cost ofliving (i|f), and locational amenities (A), but not on the
5amount of current off-farm work hours (Topel 1986; Kenny and Denslow 1980; Tokle and
Huffman, 1991). Local labor markets are linked by human (labor) and employer mobility.
This means that compensatingwage differentials exist for important personal, local labor
market, and local amenity factors (Rosen 1986; Topel 1986). This off-farm labor demand
function is summarized as
< =Prj;(C',£J,i|r,A), i=o,s. (5)
Upon substituting Q(.) into the cash-income constraint rq)resented in (3), the following
combined cash income-technology constraint is also obtained:
E *V-P^r=0. (6)
Assuming an interior solution for all allocations except for , the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (6) are:
k[P^dQ/dX-WJ = 0, (7)
XP^dQ/dTj. - y'=0, ;=o,s, (8)
i=o,s,
dU/dTl-y' =0, i=o,s (10)
dU/dY-XP^ =Q, (11)
T-Tf-Tl,-Tl =0, i=o,s. (12)
and the budget constraint (6), where k and y' (i=o> s) are Lagrange multipliers for income
and for marginal utility of farm operator's and spouse's time, respectively.
6Equations (8)-(10) provide the marginal conditions for optimal time allocation by the
operator and the spouse. If Wj < //A, then an individual's hours are allocated between
dU/dT! SO
leisure and on-farm work so that = P„ —— and T ' = 0, and no off-farm work
^ 'ar;
occurs. If Wj = y^/Af then an individual's hours are allocated among leisure, on-farm work,
dU/dTl SO
and off-farm work so that ;; = P —^ = W„ , On-farm and off-farm workoccur.
^ ar;
When = yVA an interior solution occurs and the decision on optimal production of
Q are separate from optimal consumption decisions (Strauss 1986, Huffman 1991). In this
case, equations (7)-(9) can be solved for optimal on-farm work of the operator and spouse and
other farm inputs. In particular, the demand functions for hours of on-farm work and
purchased farm inputs are summarized as:
Tf = i =o.s (13)
=G.iK, K.Vr f". 'I')- (14)
Using equations (6), (10), (11), (13) and (14), we obtain the demand function for operator's
and spouse's leisure:
' = (15)
Then using the time allocation identity for the husband and wife (12) and substituting equations
(13) and (15) for Tj '^ and Tj*, the supply functions for off-farm hours are obtained:
c = T-r^-T}'^ = (16)
When Wl^ < yVA, then optimal = o, / =o,5, and the farm production decisions
are not s^)arable from household consumption decisions. The demand function for operator's
7and spouse's on-farm work is obtained as part of the solution to equations (6)-(8) and (10)-
(12). The demand function for operator's and spouse's on-farm work hours is now:
t;* =G3.»(p^,p^.^^,.K,c^f^4>), i =o,s.' (17)
Hence, the implicit demand functions for on-farmwork hours are different for operators and
spouses that don't participate in off-farm work than for those that do. Py ^d V enter (17) but
not (13), and W° and enter (13) butnot (17).
The Data, Variables, and Econometric Model
This section contains a description of the data, empirical definition of variables, and
discussion of the econometric model.
The data
The primary data set for this study is theFCRS (Farm OperatorResource version,
1991) of theU.S. D^artment ofAgriculture. The FCRS is a national annual survey ofU.S.
farms conducted by NASS and ERS every February-March since 1985. The survey has a
complex stratified, multiframe, random design which enhances its statistical properties for
some purposes, but the sampling scheme limits its usefulness for examining several
relationships jointly. The following limits areplaced on our analysis. First, theFCRS
requires that only one person per farm bedesignated the farm operator. In 1991, 94 percent
of the farm operators were male, and in order to avoid gender heterogeneity issues in the
econometric estimates, this study focuses on the male farm operators.® Second, the complex
stratified sample design employed by the FCRS makes it impossible to consider time allocation
decisions of the farm husband and wife jointly. Forexample^ computer programs that exist
8for weighted bivariate discrete choice and seemingly-unrelated regressions produce correct
parameterestimates but erroneous standard errors, thereby limiting inferencebeyond the
sample.^ Weexclude from the analysis, those farm operators where thefarm is organized as
a non-family corporation or cooperative, those where the operator's household does not
receive any of the net incomeof the farm business, where a wife is not present, and those
where the household receives nonfarm self-employment income.® A few other observations
were excluded because of inconsistencies due to coding errors. The final sample is 2,076
observations which statistically represent about 1.4 million U.S. farm operators (or 67 percent
of all U.S. farms) in the 48 contiguous States of the U.S. in 1991.
The econometric model
Empirical models of off-farm participation and off-farm and on-farm work hours for
farm operators are presented. Define the empirical off-farm wage (W„^j) and reservation wage
(W^) equations for the j-th farm operatoras follows;
(18)
\nW^ = (19)
where €„j and are zero mean random disturbance terms for thepopulation of all farm
operators. Operators areassumed toparticipate in off-farm work when their reservation wage
is less than their market wage offer. Hence, define an off-farm wage work participation
indicator variable Dj as:
D,=
0 • (20)
9Because€^| and are randomvariables, the probability of participating in off-farm
work can be obtained as:
= 1) =>,(ln Ff;<ln =F„(5,.a) (21)
where u^. = .Sya = and F() is a cumulative distribution function for the
random variable u. Equation (21) is a reduced-form off-farm wage work participation
equation where theexplanatory variables Sj are from themarket wage and reservation wage
equations (18) and (19). If we have a consistentestimateof the wage equation for off-farm
work for all farm operators, then we can use In W^j and S^j as regressors ina structural off-
farm workparticipation equation. Other things equal, an increase of the off-farni wage is
expected to increase the probability of off-farmwagework.
For the hours of work component of this study, two sets of behavioral equations are
considered. For farm operators thatparticipate in off-farm wage work, we will estimate on-
farm labor demand and off-farm labor supply equations:
Tj. = Pjj ^1 Pi (22)
Tm = ^ hlV ^ ^ (23)
where includes regressors otherthan W„that are expected to explain on-farm labor
demand, 7^ includes regressors other than and V that areexpected toexplain off-farm
labor supply, and /Xf and are random disturbance terms. Consistent with our theory, other
income (V) does not enter the on-farm labor demand equation (22). In equation (22), we.
expect the sign of p„ tobenegative, and in equation (23), we expect P22 to benegative (i.e.,
leisure is a normal good) and P12 to be non-negative. With P12 > 0, the implication is that the
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income effect of a wage rate change and the substitution effect pull in the opposite direction
but that the substitution effect dominates.
For farm operators that do not participate in off-farm wage work, we will estimate an
on-farm labor demand equation:
r^= + +n; (24)
where Z3 is regressors other than V that are expected to explain on-farm hours and is a
random disturbance term. Consistent with our theory, the set of regressors Z3 is different
from Z, because of the demand for operator's on-farmwork is not separable from household
consumption decisions. In particular, other income (V) is a regressor in the on-farm demand
equation (24) but not in (22), and we expectYi to be negative (leisureis a normalgood) in
equation (24).
A brief empirical definition of all variables included in the econometric model is
presented in table 1. Someof the variables are farm/farm-operator sp^ific and others
reprint state or regional effects on farm operator's behavior. Furthermore, to complete the
specification of theeconometric model, we designate the variables that are include in Zj, Zj,
and Z3. Exactly what farm attributes should be included is subject to debate, e.g., Huffman
1991; Lass, Findies, and Hallberg 1989, 1991; Lass and Gempesaw 1992; Kimhi 1994.
Attributes that should be included are ones that are quasi-fixed or exogenous to off-farm
participation and hours of on- and off-farm work decisions of farm operators. To
accommodate divergent views on this subject, we proceed under two different assumptions.
Assumption 1: thevalue of farmland owned (LAND) and value of farm capital in farm
machinery and equipment, breeding stock, and farm buildings (FCAPITAL) are to be included
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in Zif Z2, and Hence, on-farm and off-farm work decisions are conditional on LAND
and FCAPITAL. Assun^tion 2: LAND and FCAPITAL are attributes that are jointly
determined with fam operator's off-farm participation and on- and off-faim hours and they
are excluded from Zj, Z2, and
Other variables are also included in Zj, Zj, and Z3. Additional variables included in Zj
are: EDS, wife's education is an indicator of the potential productivity/opportunity cost of her
time; PRAISED, an indicator of early farm-specific work experiences of the farm operator;
FHEALIM, an indicator of a health limiting condition of the farm operator; MILESCITYj an
indicatorof potential commuting distance to off-farm work and to shopping for farm and
household goods and services; FARMWAGE, wage rate for hired farm labor; RAIN and
JANT, stateclimatic indicators that canbe expected to affect farm productivity; andNE,
MIDWEST, and WEST, regional geographic indicators for realoutput and nonlabor input
prices. Additional variables included in Zj are: EDS, PRAISED, FHEALIM, HHSIZE,
MILESCITY, FARMWAGE, RAIN, JANT, NE, MIDWEST, and WEST. Additional
variables included in Z3 are: AGE, an indicator of life stage of operator and taste for
consumption of leisure relative topurchased goods; ED and EDS, indicators of potential
productivity of husband's andwife's time; andPRAISED; FHEALIM; HHSIZE;
MILESCITY; FARMWAGE; RAIN; JANT; NE;MIDWEST; andWEST.
In theoperator's off-farm wage equation (22), S^ includes his education (ED), his
potential post-schooling experience (EXP) and state amenity factors associated with winter
weather (JANT, JANT^), local labor market conditions, PURATE and ESHOCK, and regional
dummy variables. These are variables that have been used by otiiers, e.g. Tokle and
12
Huffman. EXP is chosen over actual labor market experience because it is less likely to be
endogenous to off-farm work decisions (Mroz). EXP is expected to have a quadratic effect on
In W because of finite length human life (Becker 1993). Other studies have shown that state
labor markets are interrelated through migration and migrants attempt to equalize real
compensation. Nominal wage rate differences then exist across states because of cost of living
and amenity differences (Tolley 1991; Kenny andDenslow 1980) and becauseof permanent
and transitory labor market adjustments (Topel 1986). Topel and Tokle and Huffman found
that nonfarm wage rates were higher, other things equal, where predicted state unemployment
rates where high. The higher wage rates compensated for anticipated future unemployment.
Some labormarket events are unanticipated, and they may affectwage rates, too. Topeland
Tolde andHuffman found that a positive shock to state employment growth rate relative to the
national rate has a positive effect on wage rates.
In the reduced-form off-farm participation equation, the set of regressors (S) are
approximately the set of variables S„ V, and Zj.
Return to Tablel, andnote Mme of thedifferences in variables for farm operators who
have different off-farm work status. Sample farm operators who participated in off-farm wage
work in 1991 had mean annual off-farm work of 1,895 hours and of on-farm work of 1,111
hours. Hence, mean annual on-farm and off-farm work for this group was 3,006 hours. For
the sample of farm operators who did not participate in off-farm work, mean annual on-farm
work was 2,041 hours. Sample farm operators who participate in off-farm work had
significantly less other income (OTHINC), owned farm land (LAND), and farm capital
(FCAPn'AL) and were younger (AGE), had lower frequency ofhealth problems (HEALIM),
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and had more schooling (ED) than sample farm operators who did not participate in off-farm
work.
The Empirical Results
For the sample of all farm operators, reduced-form and structural off-farm
workparticipation equations are fitted. For the subsample of farm operators who
participated in off-farm wage work, an off-farm wage equation, an on-farm labor
I
demand equation, and anoff-farm labor supply equation are fitted. For the subsample
of farm operators who did not participate in off-farm work, an on-farm labor demand
equation is fitted.
Redueed-fonn off-farm labor participation
The results fi'om fitting the reduced-form logit off-farm work participation
equation todata for 2,076 U.S. farm operators are reported in columns (1) and (2) of
table 2. The two equations differ in treatment offarm land and farm capital;
assumption 1 applies to column (1) and assumption 2 applies to column (2).
Additional other income (OTHINC) reduces the probability ofoff-farm work. It
is consistent with leisure being a normal good, and supports earlier results for U.S.
farm operators by Sumner; Huffman and Lange; Lass, Findies, and Hallberg 1989;
Gould and Saupe; and Tokle and Huffman. The effect ofoperator's age on the
probability of off-farm work is quadratic. The marginal effect ofAGE is positive up
to 45 years, and then becomes negative. Hence, participating in off-farm work is not
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primarily a new entrant to farming phenomena. Studies using relatively recent surveys
have found similar results for U.S. farm operators, e.g., Gould and Saupe; Lass,
Finders, and Hallberg 1989, Tokle and Huffman, but some of the earlier studies found
the probability of off-farm work decreasing with age, e.g., Huffman and Lange.
Our study shows impacts of several human capital variables on off-farm work
participation. Operator's education (ED) has a positive marginal effect on his
probability of off-farm work. For individuals engaged in farming, the implication is
that additional schooling increases their off-farm wage (offer) by more than it increases
their reservation wage at on-farm work or leisure. The net effect is increased
household income diversification." Our result is in agreement with other studies of
off-farm workparticipation of U.S. farmers. Wife's schooling (EDS) has a negative
but statistically insignificant effect on the probability of husband's off-farm work
participation. In other studies of male operators' off-farm work participation, wife's
schooling has generally been ignored; exceptions areHuffman and Lange and Tokle
andHuffman who found negative and significant effects.
A farm operator being farm raised (PRAISED), an indicator of early farm-
sector-specific experience, reduces the probability of his off-farm work. The
implication is that this is a type ofexperience that is imperfectly transferable to the
nonfarm labor market and increases an individual's long-term attachment to farming.
A farm operator's health status also affects his probability of off-farm work. A chronic
15
health problem that limits the amount or type of farm work (FHEALIM) also reduces
the probability of off-farm work. Although the health limitation is defined specifically
to farm work, our results suggest that its impact is relatively more severe for off-farm
work. Being self-employed as a farmer rather than as a wage worker may give an
individual more flexibility for managing work and a chronic health problem.
The impact of a larger household size is to increase the probability of off-farm
work, but the confidence is low for this coefficient. The effect of MILESCITY on the
probability of off-farm work is statistically insignificant.
Characteristics of the farm affect the probability of off-farm work. In column
(1) additional LAND and FCAPITAL decrease the probability of off-farm work. These
variables seem to have their effects by increasing the productivity of operator's on-farm
work, which raises the opportunity cost of off-farm work. In column (2), these two
variables are excluded, and although all of the estimated coefficients change, the
performance of PRAISED changes the most—becoming significantly more negative. A
higher wage rate for hired farm labor increases the probability of off-farm work,
suggesting that operator andhired labor may be complements in farm production. A
larger amount of annual precipitation increases the probability of off-farm work.
Under assumptions .1 and 2, state labor market and regional variables tend to
affect the probability of off-farm work. For operators in the Northeast andMidwest,
their probability of off-farm work is significantly lower than for operators in the South.
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Holding other regressors unchanged, farm operators in the West have a probability of
off-farm work that is not significantly different from that of operators in the South.
Off-farm wage/labor demand
The farm operator's off-farm wage equation is of interest because the predicted wage is
an instrument for the actual or potential off-farmwage of farmers^ and it provides evidenceon
the returns to human capital of farm operators in the nonfarm labor market. The off-farm
wage equation is fitted to 551 observationson male farm operators that reported off-farm
earnings in 1991.*^ The results are reported in column (5), table 2.
Theprimary focus is on the human capital variables. An additional year of education
increases farmeroperator's off-farm wage by 8.6 percent. This is 56 percent larger than Tokle
and Huffman obtained forU.S. rural nonfarm males 1978-82, using a similar specification. It
is also a larger return than Sumner obtained for a 1971 sample of Illinois farmers andHuffman
and Lange obtained using a 1978 sample of Iowa farmers but similar to the estimate obtained
by Gould and Saupeobtained with a 1982 and 1986sample of Wisconsin fanners. Evidence
from Murphy andWelch (1992) and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) shows that the return to
schooling ofU.S., male wage earners was declining and relatively low during the 1970s and
then rose dramatically during tiie 1980s to a relatively high level by 1989. Hence, tiiere is
collaborating evidence to our finding of high return in tiie nonfarm labor market to farmer
operators schooling in 1991.
An additional year ofpost-schooling experience (EXP) has a positive but diminishing
marginal effect on operator's off-farm wage rate. The maximum effect of experience occurs
17
at 27 years. Our In wage-experience profile is significantly more concave than Tokle and
Huffman found for U.S. rural non^irm married males (in 1978-82). Their data show that the
peak comes later, 37 vs. 27 years, and the return to experience is larger at the peak. Given
that EXP measures years of potential experience at all types of work, one explanation for the
difference is that farming experience is relatively sector-specific human capital and not as
valuable as off-farm experience for determining the off-farm wage.
Our results show regional differences in wage rates are partially explained by local
amenity factors (normal January temperature) and local labor market conditions (PURATE
and ESHOCK), but some regional differences remain. The wage rates of farm operators is
24 percent higher (statistically significant) in the West than the South. In the Northeast and
Midwest, the point estimate is for higher off-farmwage rates than for the South, but the
difference is not statistically significant.
Structural ofT-farm participation equation
The results from fitting the structural logit off-farm wagework participation
equation for farm operators is reported in table 2, columns (3) and (4). This equation
differs from the reduced-form off-farm participation equations in that the off-farm wage
rate is predicted for all sample operators using equation (5), table 2, and included as a
regressor, and regressors that enter only the off-farm wageequation are excluded.
The off-farm wage rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on the
operator's probability of off-farm work. At the sample mean and other things equal, a
$1 per hour increase in the operator's off-farm wage rate increases the probability of
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off-farm work by 3.4 percent. Hence, the off-farm work participation decision is
strongly affected by the financial attractiveness of the off-farm wage. For variables
that are included in both the reduced-form and structural off-farm participation
equations, the sign of the estimated coefficients are the same. Household size
(HHSIZE) and the two climate variables RAIN and JANT are, however, statistically
stronger in the structural than in the reduced-form participation equation.
Off-farm and on-fann hours: Off-farm work participants
The off-farm labor supply and on-farm labor demand equations are fitted to
data for the 551 observations on farm operators who participated in off-farm work. In
table 3, columns (l)-(4), results are reported for assumption 1 and 2 about LAND and
FCAPITAL. The equations are fitted without a sample selectionvariable. Nawata and
Nagase (1996) show that Heckman's two-step procedure (Heckman 1979) for sample
selection correction sometimes yields highly biased parameterestimates. This occurs
when the sample selection variable is highly correlated with the other regressors
included in the behavioral equation of interest. For our sample, the selection variable
is highly correlated with the regressors in the off-farm labor supply equation, and the
estimated coefficients of the variables in the off-farm labor supply equation tend to
reverse sign and fall in statistical significance when the selectionvariable is included.
Hence, we judge that the unadjusted parameter estimates are better than the adjusted
ones.^'''^^
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Operator's on-farm hours ^e not significantly affected by a higher off-farm
wage rate, but his off-farm hours increase, i.e., in the on-farm labor demand
equation (22) is not significantly different from zero and P12 in the off-farm labor
supply equation is positive. Furthermore, given the operator's time constraint
(equation 12), the larger off-farm hours imply a reduction in his leisure hours. The
effect of OTHINC on off-farm hours is negative (i'C., P22 < 0 in equation (23) and the
off-farm labor supply curve shifts back or left), the on-farm hours effect is constrained
to be zero, so the impact on operator's leisure hours is positive (shifts demand curve
for leisure out or right). The conclusion is that operator's leisure is a normal good.
When the farm operator is farm raised, his on-farm workis 208 hours per year
larger but no significant change in off-farm hours occurs. Hence, the increase in on-
farm hours comes primarily from reduced leisure hours. When an operator lives
farther from a city of 10,000 or more people, his hours of on-farm workincrease and
off-farm workdecrease by approximately off-setting magnitudes. Hence, the net effect
ofMILESCITY, a commuting distance measure, on operator's leisure hours is
approximately zero.
Under assumption 1, a larger amount of owned land (LAND) reduces operator's on-
farm workhoursand does not havea significant effect on his off-farm workhours. Hence
larger LAND increases operator's leisure hours. Alarger amount of farm capital
(FCAPITAL) increases his hours ofon-farm work (4.3 annual hours per$1^000) and reduces
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the hours of off-farm work (1.6 annual hours per $1,000). The net effect, however, is a
reduction in operator's leisure hours (2.7 annual hours per $1,000).
Under assumptions 1 and 2, a higher wage rate for hired farm labor (FARMWAGE)
tends to increase the operator's on-farm hours and to reduce his off-farm hours. Given the
different magnitude of the estimated coefficient, they imply an increase in operator's leisure
hours. The confidence in these results is low, althoughconsistent across assumptions 1 and 2.
Additional annual precipitation (RAIN) tends to reduce operator's hours of on-farm and off-
farm hours and hence to increasehis leisure. A highernormal averageJanuary temperature
reduces the demand for operator's on-farm hours (11 to 13annual hours per degree under
assumptions 1 and 2, respectively) and to increase off-farm labor supply (20 annual hours per
degree). Hence, the net effect of JANT is a decrease in operator's leisure hours.
Regional differences in on-farm and off-farm hours of workare generally insignificant,
except that farm operator's in the West work less on-farm (333 and 408 annual hours under
assumptions 1 and 2, respectively).
On-farm hours: No oft-farm work
The on-farm labor demand equation is fitted to 1,525 observations on farm operators
who specialize in farm work. In table 3, columns (5) and (6), results are reported for
assumptions 1 and 2 about LAND and FCAPITAL. No sample^selection variable is included.
Additional OTHINC reduces operator's on farm hours (statistically significant). Given
the operator's time constraint (equation 12) and off-farm hours is zero, the implication is that
operator's leisure hours increases. Furthermore, given the empirical specification of the on-
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farm labor demand equation, we infer that operator's leisure is also a normal consumption
good for farm operators who do not work off-farm.
Although operator's education (ED) does not have a significant effect on on-farm
hours, his other attributesdo affect the quantity demanded of on-farmwork. As a farm
operator becomes older (AGE), his hours of off-farm work are reduced and leisure hours
increased (24 annual hours per year of age). If the operator was fiarm raised, his hours of
on-farm work is larger (404 and 473 hours per year under assumptions 1and 2, respectively).
Themagnitude is relatively large~20 to 25percent of samples mean on-farm hours of work,
and they come fi'om reduced leisure hours. If the farm operator has a chronic health problem
(FHEALIM), his annual on-farm work is reduced 341 and 389 hours under assumptions 1and
2, respectively. Although the estimated coefficients for HHSIZE and MILESCITY are
positive, we have low confidence in these estimates.
Under assumption 1, larger LAND and FCAPITAL increase operator's hours of on-
farm work (and reduces leisure hours). The p-value for tiie coefficient ofLAND is, however,
only 13 percent. A higher JANT reduces operator's on-farm hours (and increases his leisure
hours) about 13 annual hours per degree ofnormal temperature. The sign ofFARMWAGE is
negative and ofRAIN ispositive, but we have low confidence in these effects being different
from zero. The results also suggest, other things equal, tiiat farm operators in tiie Nortiieast,
Midwest, and West work on-farm more hours per year (200 to 440 hours) than farm operators




This study has important implications for valuing the hours of farm work of farm
operators. In cost-and-returiis studies and agricultural productivity statistics, the hours of farm
work of farmers has been generally valued at the wage rate for farm hired labor (see Ball
1985; Huffman 1996). Our study shows that farm operators whoworked off farm at wage and
salary work in 1991 had an averageoff-farm wage that was more than twice as large as the
averagewage rate for hired farm labor (see table 1). Hence, the wage rate for hired farm
labor is a very poorestimate of the opportunity cost of operators' time. The primary reason
for this largedifference is thatU.S. fann operators have on average significantly more
education andexperience than hired farm labor (Huffman 1996; Gabbard and Mines 1995).
Following thelogic of oureconomic model, farm operators who donotparticipate in
off-farm wage work areexpected tohave a reservation wage that exceeds their off-farm wage
prospect. This information, however, is notgenerally available to researchers. We use our
fitted wage equation (table 2) topredict the likely off-farm wage offer of all 2,076 male farm
operators in our sample. TTie distribution of these predicted wage rates is reported in table 4.
The geometric mean is $10.26 per hour, the top 5 percent of the distribution has a predicted
hourly off-farm wage exceeding $17.00 and the lowest 10 percent of thedistribution has a
predicted wage rate below $5.84 per hour. Hence, the point we emphasize is using the wage
rate of hired farm labor (which had a mean of$5.95 per hour in 1991) tovalue farm
operator farm labor can beexpected to grossly undervalue this farm input and to contribute
to underestimates of the cost ofproduction ofmost agricultural commodities. In some cases, a
better estimate is the predicted wage rate that the individual might earn from off-farm work.
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Conclusions and Further Implications
This study has shown that farm operators' decisions for on-farm hours of work, off-
fermworkparticipation, and off-farmhours of workare consistent with predictions from an
agricultural household model. The strength of our empirical results, however, do differ
between the participation and work-hours models, and we attribute the difference to
dramatically less measurement error in the off-farm workparticipation indicator than in the
hours of workdata. The feet thatweplace somewhat greater confidence in our participation
results is given added credibility by Heckman's (1993) conclusion that empirical evidence on
individuals' labor-force participation dwisions is a very important part of understanding
aggregate labor supply.
In theestimated structural off-farm work participation equations, theoperator's off-
farm wage offer and other farm-household income are shown to have effects consistent with
expectations and to bestatistically strong predictors. At the sample mean and other things
equal, a $1 per hour increase in theoperator's off-farm wage was shown to increase his
probability of off-farmwork by 3.4 percent. A $1,000 increase in other incomedecreases the
probability ofoff-farm work by 0.5 percent. For farm operators who participate in off-farm
work, the results showed their hours ofon-farm work were unresponsive to the off-farm wage,
i.e., the on-farm labor demand curve for operator's hours isperfectly wage inelastic, but the
operators's off-farm hours responded positively to the off-farm wage. At the sample mean,
our parameter estimates imply a compensated own-wage elasticity of operator's off-farm hours
is about 0.16. The income elasticity ofoff-farm labor supply is about -0.018. Furthermore,
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the size of thesewage and incomedasticity estimates is not affected significantly by
assumptionsabout operator's hours of work being conditioned on or endogenous to the amount
of owned farm land and farm capital. For farm operators who specialized in on-farmwork,
the income elasticity of demand for operator's on-farm hours is negative, -0.015 at the sample
mean. Hence, given the timeconstraint on operator's total available hours, the empirical
results implytheir leisurehours are a normal consumption good irrespective of their off-farm
work status.
Our empirical results seem to be consistent with long-term events in U.S. agriculture.
The farm problem ^ described by Gardner (1992) exists partly because of an upward sloping
labor supply to agriculture. Furthermore, it is ameliorated by improved off-farm work
opportunities when labor moves between the farm and nonfarm sectors. Taking off-farm
work by some farm operators is one method of reducing the quantity of labor employed in
agriculture. Leaving agriculture permanently is of course another option, butfarm-sector
specific human capital would belost. Second, our results imply that farm operators that have
better off-farm wage opportunities respond positively to these incentives—increased probability
ofoff-farm work and increased hours of off-farm work, given a decision to participate. Third,
the conclusion from our results that operators' leisure hours are a normal consumption good
irrespective oftheir off-farm work status seems consistent with some empirical evidence and a
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Endnotes
1. Lange 1980, however, examined off-farm and on-farm hours decisions for a sample of
Iowa farm operators and wives.
2. In order to keep the analysis simple, the time allocation of other members of the
households are not considered.
3. To simplify the model, we have chosen to ignore the nonnegativity constraint for
on-farm hours of work. Kimhi (1994), however, found this to be an important
constraint to Israeli farm households.
4. Note that the utility function Uand the nonstochastic farm production function of the
household Q are quasi-concave, continuous, and twice differentiable.
5. For this case, the demand equation for X, Y, and are all a function of the
same variables.
6. The dominance of operators who are male arises partly from the fact that the FCRS
does not permit a designation of husband-wife jointly operated farm (Aheam, Perry,
and El-Osta).
7. We do not consider this limitation to be serious. When U.S. studies have considered
the joint off-farm work participation of a farm husband and wife, most have found
statistically insignificant correlation, e.g.. Lass andGempesaw; Lass, Findeis and
Hallberg 1989; and Huffman and Lange.
8. In the 1991 FCRS, 16.9 percent of the farm operator households had off-farm self-
employment income, and 10.4 percent of male farm operators were notmarried.
Exclusion ofobservations where the farm operator or the operator's spouse reported
self-employment off-farm earnings is done inorder for wage rates computed here as
wages and salaries divided by annual off-farm work hours to be computed with more
accuracy.
9. We acknowledge that faim land operated onmost U.S. farms consists of owned land
and rented land. We, however, chose owned farm land as a regressor rather than
operated farm land because owned farm land is more likely to be exogenous to the
on-farm and off-farm work decisions offarm operators. With active cropland rental
markets existing across the United States, farm operators can annually make joint
decisions on acres operated andhours of on-farm and off-farm work. When decisions
are joint, including acres operated as a regressor in the on-farm or off-farm work hours
equation will cause simultaneous equation bias (Green 1997, Ch. 16). The value of
dairy herd breeding stock is included in FCAPITAL, and we believe that this is a better
method of includmg the effect ofa dairy operation than to define a dummy variable for
presence or absence of a dairy enterprise on a farm.
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10. Estimation of equations was completed in PC-CARP (Fuller et al.) to take account of
the complex stratified sample design arid weighting system. The program adjusts all
standard errors for heteroscedasticity of unknown form by the Taylor approximation
for the variance (see Fuller et al.; Kott 1991).
11. Huang and Orazem (1997) have shown with county data that an increase in schooling
also increases the likelihood of a net exit from farming.
12. Having off-farm employment does, however, have a major advantage of access to
relatively inexpensive health insurance, e.g., Jensen and Salant.
13. When a sample selection variable A,was derived (see Lee 1982) from the fitted off-farm
participation equation reported in column (1) and (2), table 1, and included as a
regressor in the wage equation, the coefficient of the selection variable was not
significantly different from zero.
14. AGE and EDS are excluded because EXP = AGE-ED-6, and they are not included in
Zi and Zj.
15. When X, the selection variable, is derived from the reduced-form participation
equation (column 2, table 2), and regressed on the variables of the off-farm labor
supply equation (column 1, table 3), the is 0.8. When Xis regressed onthe
variables of the off-farm wage equation (from column 5, table 2), the is only 0.4.
16. Other potential methods for dealing with sample selection include a one-step maximum
likelihood estimator and semi-parametric estimation (Newey, Powell, andWalker
1990). They were not pursued because of the complex nature of the survey design.
17. We also judge that the data on farm operators' hours ofwork to be relatively noisey.
In the 1991 FCRS, NASS asked farm operators inMarch or April of 1992 to estimate
(1) on average, howmany hours per week did you do farm or ranch work on this
operation during each month in 1991 and (2) onaverage, how many hours perweek
did you work during each month in 1991 at off-farm jobs? This approach is subject to
major recall bias. Furthermore, the questions pertaining to on-farm and off-farm
work hours were 18 pages apart in the survey questionnaire, so the survey does not
encourage farm operators to think about the reasonableness of their total hours of work
on- and off-farm.
18. All AGE or EXP effects on hours ofwork for these farm operators are channeled
through the predicted off-farm wage. When AGE is included as a separate regressor in
these hours of work equations, its coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
Because relatively few of these operators were less than 35 years ofage, a quadratic














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Estimated coefficients for off-farm wage labor participation and off-farm wage
equations: U.S. farm operators, 1991 (adjusted t-ratios in parentheses)
OfF-FarmWage Labor Participation Off-Farm
Regressors Reduced-form Equation Structural Equation Wage Eg ^
0) (3) (4) (5)
OTHINC - -3.75 x lO'^ -3.39 x 10 ' -5.76 x 10*^ -5.38 x lO"'
(3.63) . (3.72) , (4.86) (4.90)
OTHINCVIOOO 3.97xl0-« 3.44 xlO"® 6.59x10-8 6.09 xlO"®





ED 0.117 0.098 0.086
(2.47) (2.12) (4.70)
EDS -0.020 -0.068 -1.11 x 10"^ -0.062





PRAISED -0.387 -0.717 -0.351 -0.692
(1.60) (3.17) (1.48) (3.12) „
FHEALIM -0.701 -0.637 -0.786 -0.718
(2.16) (1.96) (2.34) (2.15)
HHSEE 0.090 0.091 0.211 0.216
(1.29) (1.48) (3.43) (3.85)









OfT-Farm Waee Labor Particioation OfF-Farm
Regressors Reduced-form Equation Structural Equation WageEq. ^
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FARMWAGE 0.526 0.582 0.517 0.524
(1.69) (2.09) (1.72) (1.93)
RAIN 0.281 0.281 0.389 ^ 0.436
(1.72) (1.78) (2.47) (2.88)
JANT -0.013 0.014 -0.067 -0.056 -0.017
(0.29) (0.36) (4.49) (4.00) (1.42)
JANT^/lOO -0.071 -0.090 0.023
(1.17) (1.62) (1.11)
PURATE 0.128 0.146 0.098
(1.63) (1.87) (2.73)
ESHOCK -0.071 -0.064 -0.049
(1.89) (1.84) (2.74)
NE -1.690 -1.901 -2.290 -2.482 0.190
(2.81) (3.90) (3.89) (5.17) (1.06)
MIDWEST -1.023 -1.056 -1.209 -1.223 0.037
(2.61) (2.87) (2.97) (3.23) (0.33)
WEST 0.258 0.023 -0.148 -0.250 0.237
(0.49) (0.05) (0.30) (0.55) (2.42)
0FFWAGE2 . 0.215 0.194
(7.56) (6.69)
Intercept -11.70 -11.11 -3.405 -3.435 0.631
(4.53) (4.89) (1.94) (2.23) (1.61)
X^-statistic 155.6 144.8 167.5 159.7 —
McFadden's R^ 0.323 0.230 0.281 0.185
R2 0.206
Sample 2,076 2,076 2,076 2,076 551
' Dependent variable is «n(OFFWAGE).
^Wage ispredicted for all farm operators using column (5) ofthe table.
Table 3, Estimated coefficients for off-farm labor supply and on-farm labor demand
equations: U.S. farm operators, 1991 (adjusted t-ratios in parentheses)
Regressors
Farm operators reporting olY-farmwage work









No off-farm wage work





















































































































































































0.140 0.257 0.112 0.131 0.295 0.254
Sample size 551 551 551 "551 1,525 1,525
Thewage is predicted using the estimates from table 2, column 5.
















This distribution was derived using PC CARP (Fuller et a!.), coefficient estimates reported
in table 2, column (5), and actual sample data on regressors.
